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ABSTRACT 
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 compels an 
insider to disgorge short-swing profits earned from a paired purchase 
and sale of the issuer’s securities executed within six months.  On 
one hand, Section 16(b)’s introductory purpose clause seems to limit 
the statute’s application to instances where there might be a risk of 
speculative abuse.  On the other hand, Section 16(b) imposes a strict 
liability-like standard that triggers disgorgement once the statute’s 
objectively applied criteria are met.  The circuit courts, in 
interpreting Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 
the seminal Supreme Court decision on the matter, are divided over 
whether to adopt an objective or subjective approach and, as such, 
how and when to apply the Supreme Court’s unorthodox transaction 
exemption from 16(b) liability.  This Note analyzes the split and 
offers a critique of the Second Circuit’s pragmatic interpretation of 
Kern County’s ruling. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”),1 short-swing profits earned by a corporate insider 
from the paired sale and purchase, or purchase and sale, of the issuer’s 
security within a six month period may be disgorged and recovered by 
the issuer.2  Section 16(b), passed at the dawn of the New Deal era as a 
restriction on insider trading, has never been a provision that provided 
fertile grounds for litigation since its impact always lay more in its 
deterrent, or prophylactic, effect than in its prosecutorial ambitions.3  
                                                                                                                             
 1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. The mechanical, bright line rule for administration of Section 16(b) facilitates 
the establishment of a strong deterrent effect, while avoiding a taxing amount of 
litigation. See Karl Shumpei Okamoto, Rereading Section 16(b) of the Securities 
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Operating very much under the radar, and under the shadows of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s own insider trading restriction,4 Section 16(b) 
has endured the test of time all the same.5 
Still, in recent years, its efficacy has been challenged, or at least, 
complicated by a constantly evolving class of “‘unorthodox’ 
transactions”6 and an increasingly complex array of financial 
instruments, which have threatened to elude classification as Section 
16(b) purchases and sales.7  In the face of these challenges, Section 
16(b)’s introductory purpose clause, which self-identifies the statute’s 
underlying rationale, has proven to be both a stabilizing force that has 
guided courts’ application of Section 16(b) and a destabilizing force that 
has compelled courts to engage in the type of ad hoc, case-specific 
analysis that defies simple administration of the law.8  The same 
adaptations that have ensured Section 16(b)’s durability have 
accelerated its demise as a prophylactic measure.9 
This Note focuses primarily on the types of transactions that are 
subject to Section 16(b) disgorgement and, in particular, how the 
purpose clause dictates the choices that courts and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have made regarding the Section 16(b) 
eligibility of unorthodox transactions and derivative securities.  Since 
the terms “purchase” and “sale” are meant to be construed in a way that 
advances the statutory purpose, courts typically subject a transaction to 
the restrictions of Section 16(b) only if treating the transaction as a 
“purchase” or “sale” is supportable under the statute and if the 
transaction could give rise to speculative abuse.10 
                                                                                                                             
Exchange Act, 27 GA. L. REV. 183, 192 (1992) (citing Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 
F.2d 348, 351(2d Cir. 1970)). 
 4. Id. at 184. 
 5. Id. at 183–84. 
 6. This term was coined by Professor Louis Loss, who used it in reference to a 
group of transactions including “stock conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and 
other corporate reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and dealings in options, rights 
and warrants.” 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961), quoted in 
Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593 n.24 (1973). 
 7. See Peter J. Romeo & Alan L. Dye, Developments Under Section 16, in ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY: FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES LAW 598 (2011). 
 8. See infra Parts II and III. 
 9. See infra Parts III and IV. 
 10. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970) (“[C]ourts have 
generally concluded that a transaction falls within the ambit of Section 16(b) if it can be 
692 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
Part I of this Note first presents an overview of Section 16(b) of the 
Exchange Act, including its statutory elements and basic judicial 
overlay.  This Part then examines the statute’s preamble, or introductory 
clause, which explicitly identifies the statute’s goal.  After considering 
the standard, Supreme Court-approved understanding of the statutory 
purpose, this Part presents two scholars’ innovative readings of Section 
16(b)’s purpose.  Challenging the presumption that Section 16(b) was 
exclusively designed to protect investors from insider trading, these 
scholars attribute more nuanced and particular motivations to the 
lawmakers who drafted the Exchange Act. 
Part II assesses the early judicial shift, popularized by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp.,11 away from a harsh and objective application of Section 16(b) 
toward a more relaxed, pragmatic, and statutory purpose-driven 
application.  This Part analyzes how, instead of automatically branding 
all transactions that meet Section 16(b)’s technical criteria as Section 
16(b) restricted purchases or sales, courts have developed a 
methodology of case-by-case analysis, under which a matching purchase 
and sale can only trigger disgorgement in cases that allow for the 
possibility of speculative abuse.  In particular, Part II explores the 
Supreme Court-sanctioned unorthodox transaction exception and the 
varying interpretations of it offered by the circuit courts.  It presents a 
split between the Second Circuit, which interprets the Supreme Court 
ruling in light of its statutory purpose-driven, subjective approach to 
Section 16(b), and the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, which read the Supreme 
Court ruling through the lens of their objective approach to Section 
16(b).  Finally, Part II demonstrates how the subjective approach shaped 
the SEC’s decision to classify derivative security transactions as Section 
16(b) purchases and sales. 
Part III takes a critical look at the Second Circuit’s statutory 
purpose-driven reading of the Supreme Court’s unorthodox transaction 
exception.  After offering a more nuanced and complex rendering of the 
Second Circuit position, this Part highlights some of the failures of the 
Second Circuit view.  Ultimately, this analysis leads to the conclusion 
that the Second Circuit approach necessitates an ad hoc, case-specific 
                                                                                                                             
reasonably characterized as a ‘purchase’ or ‘sale’ without doing violence to the 
language of the statute, and if the transaction is of a kind which can possibly lend itself 
to the speculation encompassed by Section 16(b).”). 
 11. 411 U.S. 582 (1973). 
2013] SECTION 16(b) EXISTENTIALISM 693 
 
approach that does not properly serve the prophylactic interests of 
Section 16(b). 
I. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 16(b) 
Part I of this Note first introduces the statutory elements that form 
the basis of a Section 16(b) claim for disgorgement.  Next, it highlights 
the strict liability-like regime created by the mechanical operation of 
those elements.  Then, it presents a discussion of the underlying 
rationale behind the statute, as articulated in the statute’s introductory 
clause and interpreted by the courts and by modern day scholars.  Part I 
then addresses the early judicial attempts to reconcile the objective 
terms of Section 16(b) application with the statutory purpose and 
illustrates how those early decisions culminated in the seminal Supreme 
Court decision on the matter.   Finally, this Part concludes by examining 
the confounding factors in Kern County that contributed to a circuit split 
revolving around the scope of Kern County’s unorthodox transaction 
exemption.   
A. SECTION 16(b) STATUTORY ELEMENTS 
To establish a Section 16(b) claim for disgorgement, the plaintiff—
either the security issuer or one of its shareholders who files suit 
derivatively12—must prove that the defendant—a corporate insider or 
over-10% shareholder—realized profit from a paired purchase and sale 
of the issuer’s securities within a six month period.13  The terms “sale” 
                                                                                                                             
 12. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (“Suit 
to recover [short-swing] profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the 
name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within 
sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no 
such suit shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit was realized.”). 
 13. See Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 
1998).  The statute states, in relevant part:  
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been 
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to 
the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and 
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) . . . 
shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part 
of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of 
holding the security or security-based swap agreement purchased or of not 
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and “purchase” are not explicitly defined in Section 16(b) itself, but 
have been broadly defined elsewhere in the Exchange Act.14  Under the 
Act, “[t]he terms ‘buy’ and ‘purchase’ include any contract to buy, 
purchase, or otherwise acquire,” while “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ 
include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of.”15  These 
definitions, as applied to Section 16(b), expose a wide range of 
transactions to liability.16  In fact, a purchase or sale does not need to be 
scrutinized under the standard trappings of contract law or commercial 
law to meet Section 16(b) requirements.17  Nevertheless, the emergence 
of so-called “unorthodox transactions” and the rapid growth of the 
derivative securities market challenged the courts and the SEC to further 
widen the net of transactions that could be classified as Section 16(b) 
purchases and sales so as to effectuate the statutory purpose of Section 
16(b).18 
B. SECTION 16(b)’S MECHANICAL OPERATION 
Section 16(b) establishes bright line rules under which an insider’s 
in and out sequence of trades within a six month period creates a 
presumption of abuse.19  That is to say that “paired” transactions trigger 
Section 16(b) liability whether or not the insider intended for them to 
offset one another as a means of securing speculative profit.20  
                                                                                                                             
repurchasing the security or security-based swap agreement sold for a period 
exceeding six months.  
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
 14. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(13)–(14), 15 U.S.C. § 
78(c)(a)(13)–(14) (2006). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209, 391 (1987). 
 17. Id. (citing, e.g., Portnoy v. Revlon, Inc., 650 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1981)). 
See also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1970). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 193 (quoting Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 611 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
 20. Section 16(b) allows for the disgorgement of insider profits “irrespective of any 
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such 
transaction of holding the security or security-based swap agreement purchased or of 
not repurchasing the security or security-based swap agreement sold for a period 
exceeding six months.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 
(2006).  An insider can earn a “speculative profit” by “investing in the securities of his 
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Legislators intentionally crafted Section 16(b) to operate in this 
mechanical way so as to facilitate practical administration of the rule.  
Thomas G. Corcoran, advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
one of the drafters of Section 16, famously testified at the legislative 
hearing on the Exchange Act that: 
[Y]ou hold the director, irrespective of any intention or expectation 
to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be 
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or 
expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because 
you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director 
intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.21  
As a by-product of this strict liability-like regime,22 which links any 
two counter-transactions of the insider’s company stock, realized profits 
for Section 16(b) purposes are computed as the difference between the 
highest sale price and lowest purchase price for which an identical 
number of the insider’s shares were transacted within a six month 
period.23  Section 16(b)’s objective standard is also a determining factor 
in establishing the potential liability of the parties involved.  The 
statute’s flat rule, which calls for a presumption of abuse, only applies to 
corporate insiders and beneficial owners—over-10%-owners of the 
company’s stock.24  The extension of the law, beyond the typical 
corporate executive or officer to include an over-10%-beneficial owner 
as a statutory insider, presumes that such a person exerts enough control 
                                                                                                                             
issuer, holding them briefly, and then divesting himself of his investment at a tidy 
profit.” Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 21. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the S. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 73d Cong. 6557 (1934) (testimony of Thomas Corcoran). 
 22. See Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“The statute, as written, establishes strict liability for all transactions that meet 
its mechanical requirements.”). 
 23. See Donoghue v. Natural Microsystems Corp., 198 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).  This “lowest purchase price, highest sale price” rule, known as the 
‘Lowest-In, Highest-Out’ method, is considered “w[e]ll-established.” Huppe ex rel. 
WCPS Int’l Inc. v. Special Situations Fund, 565 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 1969)).  The rule 
was first established by the Second Circuit in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 
(2d Cir. 1943). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
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over the company to be privy to inside information.25  Even then, the 
bright line rule establishes that a beneficial owner can only face Section 
16(b) liability if he owned over 10% of the stock at the time of both the 
sale and purchase.26  In contrast to corporate insiders and statutory 
insiders, Section 16(b) liability can never attach to outside investors, 
who become privy to inside information through a tippee.27 
C. SECTION 16(b)’S STATUTORY PURPOSE 
While it is highly unusual for Congress to articulate a provision’s 
underlying rationale in the language of the statute itself, lawmakers 
incorporated an introductory clause, or preamble, into the statutory 
language of Section 16(b) to do just that.  The legislative history of 
Section 16(b) suggests any number of possible reasons that lawmakers 
may have deemed it necessary in this instance.28  For one, Congress may 
have inserted the clause to bolster the constitutionality of Section 
16(b),29 which was somewhat questionable given the statute’s broad 
grant of rulemaking authority to the SEC30 and Congress’s arguable 
overreach of its regulatory authority beyond the realm of interstate 
                                                                                                                             
 25. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1055 (2d Cir. 
1975) (“The 10% holder in the garden variety case is presumed to be ‘influential’ as a 
friend of management or in control of some directors.”). 
 26. Section 16(b) states: “This subsection shall not be construed to cover any 
transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase 
and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security or security-based swap agreement or a 
security-based swap involved, or any transaction or transactions which the Commission 
by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the purpose of this 
subsection.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). See also 
Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 423 (1972). 
 27. Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403, 411–12 (1962). 
 28. The interpretations offered here are not the product of mere conjecture, but 
have been offered by commentators who gleaned them from Section 16(b)’s legislative 
history. See Steve Thel, The Genius Of Section 16: Regulating The Management Of 
Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 481 (1991). 
 29. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1943) (“The 
legislative custom to insert declarations of purpose as an aid to constitutionality is well 
known.”). 
 30. Thel, supra note 28, at 481–82 (citing LOSS, supra note 6, at 547–48).  Under 
the statute, Section 16(b) “shall not be construed to cover any transaction . . . which the 
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the 
purpose of this subsection.” 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
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commerce.31  At minimum, the statute’s self-declared purpose may have 
been seen as a necessary check on the SEC’s statutorily granted power 
to exempt securities from Section 16(b)’s clampdown on insider 
trading.32  The inclusion of the statutory purpose in the Act would force 
the SEC to limit the exercise of its exemptive authority in ways 
consistent with the statutory purpose.33 
The statute’s introductory clause explains that the disgorgement of 
short swing profits is “[f]or the purpose of preventing the unfair use of 
information which may have been obtained by [a] beneficial owner, 
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer . . . .”34  The 
Supreme Court understood from Section 16(b)’s introductory clause that 
the provision was deemed necessary by Congress to attain the Exchange 
Act’s stated goal of “insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest 
markets.”35  It famously observed that “Congress sought to curb the evils 
of insider trading [by] . . . taking the profits out of a class of transactions 
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great.”36  
Moreover, the Court noted that the Section 16(b) restriction was directed 
at an issuer’s directors and officers, as well as stockholders with over 
10% control, because of the presumption that their positions with the 
issuer company afforded them access to insider information.37  
                                                                                                                             
 31. Thel, supra note 28, at 483–84.  According to Thel’s theory, the true agenda 
underlying the statute may have been hidden out of concern that political opponents 
would object to Congress’s regulation of corporations, seeing it as an unconstitutional 
regulation of intrastate commerce.  Attributing Section 16(b)’s purpose to insider 
trading on the stock market makes it easier to present the law as a regulation of 
interstate commerce. Id. at 483–84. 
 32. Id. at 481. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). 
 35. Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 591 (1973) 
(quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006)).  One Second 
Circuit decision, which had already declared achieving a “fair and honest market” to be 
the primary purpose of 16(b), described such a market as one that “reflect[s] an 
evaluation of securities in light of all available and pertinent data.” See Smolowe v. 
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 36. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 243 (1976) 
(quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 423 (1972)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 37. Id. at 243–44. 
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Henceforth, lower courts and scholars almost unanimously adopted the 
Supreme Court’s articulation of the statutory purpose as gospel.38 
Still, despite courts’ unanimous view that Section 16(b) was meant 
to combat the evils of insider trading, a variation in one important detail 
yields two slightly different court formulations of the statutory 
purpose.39  Some courts indicate that the statutory purpose of Section 
16(b) is to prevent the unjust enrichment of corporate insiders at the 
expense of investors who are not privy to the same high-level, privileged 
information.40  In other words, the statute protects an insider’s trading 
partner from being taken advantage of by an insider who has superior 
information by virtue of his or her relationship to the issuer.41  
Generally, then, the law protects the public by leveling the playing field 
for all investors. 
Other courts train Section 16(b)’s focus on protecting outside 
stockholders from the speculative abuse of insiders.42  From this 
perspective, Section 16(b) not only seeks to correct for the systemic 
problem wrought by an information imbalance favoring insiders, but 
also to put an end to stock price manipulations that insiders could 
orchestrate to artificially raise or lower stock prices and guarantee 
                                                                                                                             
 38. See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5A DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
SECURITIES LAWS § 4:150 n.3 (2012) (listing cases).  The Supreme Court considered it 
“well known” that Congress enacted Section 16(b) to curb insider trading. Foremost-
McKesson, 423 U.S. at 243 (“The general purpose of Congress in enacting § 16(b) is 
well known.” (citing Kern County, 411 U.S. at 591–92; Reliance Elec., 404 U.S. at 
422)). 
 39. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 357–58.  As early as 1943, the Second Circuit had 
explicitly articulated the twin goals of Section 16(b) in a similar way. See Smolowe, 136 
F.2d at 235. 
 40. See Foremost-McKesson, 423 U.S. at 243. 
 41. Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell Indus., Inc., 315 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2002); 
Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Section 
16(b) of the Exchange Act seeks to deter ‘insiders,’ who are presumed to possess 
material information about the issuer, from using such information as a basis for 
purchasing or selling the issuer’s equity securities at an advantage over persons with 
whom they trade.”).  In fact, in one recent decision, the Second Circuit asserted that 
Section 16(b)’s purpose is only advanced by its enforcement in cases where an 
asymmetry of information benefits the insider at the expense of the insider’s trading 
partner. See Roth v. Perseus, L.L.C., 522 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
SEC did not exceed its statutorily granted power under Section 16(b) by exempting 
certain transactions between an insider and the insider’s issuer under Rule 16b-3(d)). 
 42. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 357–58. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Crane 
Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1060 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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themselves a profit on a short term investment in the stock.43  As such, 
Section 16(b) protects not only the potential investor community and, 
more specifically, an insider’s unsuspecting trading partner, but it also 
protects actual stockholders of the security who are not privy to the 
same high level information and could be victimized by an insider’s 
manipulation of the stock.44 
Despite the explicit and seemingly incontrovertible statutory 
language that 16(b) was meant to “prevent the unfair use of 
information” by corporate insiders, some scholars point to weaknesses 
and inconsistencies that have eroded their faith in and fidelity to the 
stated statutory purpose.  For one, they observe, Section 16(b) is both 
overbroad and under-inclusive if its goal is to deter insider trading.45  
Section 16(b)’s strict liability-like enforcement renders the statute 
overbroad since it restricts insiders who do not necessarily have any 
insider information.46  At the same time, it is too narrowly constructed to 
be able to reach all statutory insiders who possess inside information 
and trade on that basis.47  In fact, Section 16(b) only allows for the 
disgorgement of short swing profits earned by insiders from a sale and 
purchase executed within six months of one another.48  It is fair game, 
under 16(b), therefore, for insiders to buy and sell on the basis of inside 
information as long as their transactions are spaced out over more than 
six months.49  Moreover, these scholars observe, if the goal was really to 
level the playing field, the narrow construction of Section 16(b) is 
misguided since it handicaps enforcement of the statute with regard to 
outsiders who obtain insider information.50 
In recent years, scholars have advanced alternative theories behind 
Section 16(b)’s statutory purpose, including some that either disregard 
or blatantly contradict the statute’s self-described purpose.51  Professor 
Steve Thel offers perhaps the most novel explanation, plumbing Section 
                                                                                                                             
 43. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 358–59 (citing Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 
1966)). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191–92; Thel, supra note 28, at 417. 
 46. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191; Thel, supra note 28, at 417. 
 47. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191–92; Thel, supra note 28, at 417. 
 48. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 191; Thel, supra note 28, at 417. 
 49. Thel, supra note 28, at 417–18. 
 50. Id. at 446; Okamoto, supra note 3, at 209. 
 51. See Okamoto, supra note 3; Thel, supra note 28. 
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16’s legislative history to uncover what he believes is the hidden agenda 
underlying Section 16(b).52  Thel argues that, while restricting insider 
trading was certainly a goal of some lawmakers in passing Section 
16(b),53 the true goal of Section 16(b) was to regulate corporate 
management.54 
According to Thel’s theory, lawmakers were more concerned with 
ensuring the overall financial well-being of publicly held corporations 
than with eliminating the insider trading advantage corporate insiders 
might exploit to line their own pockets.55  Congress designed Section 
16(b) to facilitate corporations’ long-term growth and sustainability, and 
thereby maximize corporate profits and shareholder gains, by aligning 
the interests of corporate management with the interests of 
stockholders.56  Specifically, Section 16(b)’s drafters hoped that 
requiring corporate insiders to hold onto their issuer company’s stock 
for the long-term would discourage insiders from manipulating the 
market and artificially driving the stock price up or down long enough 
for them to manufacture short-swing profits.57 
Thel hypothesizes that lawmakers sought to hide Section 16(b)’s 
true agenda of effecting a change in corporate structure, under the guise 
that 16(b)’s purpose was to curb insider trading.58  In the drafters’ 
minds, concealment of Section 16(b)’s true purpose may have been a 
necessary tactic to ensure broad support from lawmakers for the passage 
of Section 16.59  Disclosure of Section 16(b)’s genuine purpose was seen 
as likely to expose the provision to political opposition claims that the 
government was wrongly imposing its will on corporate America and 
that the provision was constitutionally objectionable.60  Attributing 
                                                                                                                             
 52. Thel offers a critical analysis of the legislative history of Section 16, generally, 
and demonstrates that increasing unemployment among the general public was the 
primary force behind the New Deal securities laws.  Recalibrating the corporate 
structure was seen as a means of ultimately improving the plight of consumers and 
workers, with not so much of a focus on protecting investors as we tend to think. Id. at 
410–11.  A thorough treatment of the legislative history is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 53. Id. at 453. 
 54. Id. at 405–06. 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. at 399–400. 
 57. Id. at 433. 
 58. Id. at 483. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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Section 16(b) to insider trading, however, was a much safer option since 
insider trading was seen as an exploitative practice that most lawmakers 
were presumably eager to eliminate.61 
Professor Karl Shumpei Okamoto offers a second, alternative basis 
for Section 16(b) founded on modern finance economics.62  The purpose 
of Section 16(b), argues Okamoto, is to disincentivize insiders from 
transacting in the issuer’s stocks for the sole purpose of manipulating 
the market and artificially effecting price changes.63  Under Okamoto’s 
theory, the public assumes that corporate insiders trade based on the 
inside information at their disposal.64  Because of that perception, 
corporate insiders’ decisions about whether to buy or sell company stock 
generally trigger temporary price fluctuations in the marketplace, as 
investors make the corresponding transactions that they believe will 
enable them to capitalize on the corporate news presumably being 
broadcast by an insider’s trading patterns.65  But, if an insider 
deliberately buys or sells company stock in order to elicit a market 
reaction, and not because of any corporate news, the false signal it 
produces affords the insider the opportunity to exploit investors’ 
misreading of the market signal and reap a short-swing profit before the 
market has a chance to recover.66  Section 16(b) was meant to counteract 
abuse of this market power; corporate insiders who manipulate the 
market for personal gain can no longer trade in and out on a short term 
basis to reap their ill-gained speculative profits.67 
Okamoto, much like Thel, minimizes the importance of Section 
16(b)’s introductory clause.  According to Okamoto, Section 16(b)’s 
introductory clause is merely a “speech” that expresses the concerns of 
                                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 483–84. 
 62. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 183, 198.  Professor Okamoto explains that, 
according to modern finance theory, “the value of a capital asset, such as stock, is a 
function of such asset’s systemic risk and its expected return.” Id. at 198 (citing, e.g., 
RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 161–65 
(4th ed. 1991).       
 63. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 185. 
 64. Id. at 201. 
 65. Id. at 204. 
 66. Id. at 197. 
 67. Id. at 197–98. 
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Section 16(b)’s drafters68 and, most certainly, is not a controlling or 
dispositive guide to 16(b)’s application; however, as much as Okamoto 
fancies himself to be “[f]reed from [the preamble’s] excessive 
ambition,”69 he, as well as Thel, cannot break free from nor deny the 
courts’ repeated attributions of the statute to insider trading.70  In fact, 
the courts’ renderings of the statutory purpose have played a pivotal role 
in shaping the contours of Section 16(b) jurisprudence.71 
D. BACKGROUND: EARLY SPLIT AMONG THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS 
The relative importance of the statute’s purpose clause and the flat 
rule of Section 16(b) almost immediately became the basis of a split 
among the lower courts regarding Section 16(b)’s scope.72  As early as 
1943, in Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,73 the Second Circuit downplayed 
the interpretive value of Section 16(b)’s preamble74 and opted to abide 
by an objective, flat rule application of Section 16(b).75  Early on, this 
position, which was also adopted by some other circuit courts,  seemed 
to have become the mainstream Second Circuit view.76   
The contrary view, ultimately adopted by the majority of courts, 
found the introductory clause to be an overriding factor that superseded 
                                                                                                                             
 68. Id. at 208 (“The broad language of the preamble was [nothing but a] a speech, a 
loose articulation of what was on the minds of some of those who participated in 
adopting the statute.”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
 71. See infra Part II. 
 72. See Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 
n.26 (1973). 
 73. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943). 
 74. Okamoto, supra note 3, at 207.  See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 
236 (2d Cir. 1943) (“The failure to limit the recovery to profits gained from misuse of 
information justifies the conclusion that the preamble was inserted for other purposes 
than as a restriction on the scope of the Act.”). 
 75. See Smolowe, 136 F.2d at 231. See also Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 
F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947) (adopting the objective rule approach and holding that a 
conversion of preferred stock into common stock qualified as a statutory “purchase” 
that, paired with a subsequent sale, gave rise to 16(b) disgorgement). 
 76. See, e.g., Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965); Adler v. 
Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 
(2d Cir. 1947).  It was a decidedly imbalanced split among the circuit courts, as the 
clear majority view adopted the pragmatic approach. Id. 
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the mechanical application of Section 16(b).77  In fact, the Second 
Circuit itself later repudiated its earlier commitment to the objective rule 
and held, for the first time, in Blau v. Lamb,78 that notwithstanding 
Section 16(b)’s crude rule of thumb, a court should not apply 16(b) 
unless it first ascertained that the transaction at hand gave rise to the 
possibility of speculative abuse.79  The Second Circuit’s change of heart 
was so complete that it would later note “[t]he judicial tendency, 
especially in th[e Second Circuit], . . . to interpret Section 16(b) in ways 
that are most consistent with the legislative purpose.”80  Under this 
subjective approach, a borderline transaction, which did not clearly fall 
within the scope of Section 16(b) purchases and sales, could still qualify 
for 16(b) liability if it could give rise to speculative abuse.81 
E. SUPREME COURT’S FIDELITY TO SECTION 16(b)’S INTRODUCTORY 
CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court later weighed in, adopting the subjective, 
pragmatic approach to Section 16(b).82  In so doing, it established a 
template for how the introductory purpose clause should interact with 
the statutory interpretation of Section 16(b) as a whole.  Specifically, it 
held that any ambiguity in the statute should be resolved in favor of the 
explanation that most closely adheres to the statutory purpose of curbing 
insiders’ short-swing trading.83  Liability cannot, however, follow under 
circumstances that fall short of the criteria specified in Section 16(b), no 
matter how much a Section 16(b) disgorgement would fulfill the 
statutory purpose.84 
                                                                                                                             
 77. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 428. 
 78. 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 79. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 518–19 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 80. Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969)). See also 
DiLorenzo v. Murphy, 443 F.3d 224, 227 (2d Cir. 2006); Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell 
Indus., Inc., 315 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 81. Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 82. See Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 411 U.S. 582 (1973). 
 83. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 (1972). 
 84. Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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In its seminal Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp. decision,85 the Supreme Court  amplified the introductory clause’s 
role as a dispositive factor and, therefore, shrank Section 16(b)’s sphere 
of influence.86  Ultimately, though, the scope of Kern County’s impact 
remained wholly undefined until the lower courts later weighed in on 
the severability of the Supreme Court’s holding from Kern County’s 
specific fact pattern.87  Since courts were initially divided about whether 
to extrapolate Kern County’s holding to other cases or whether to limit 
Kern County to a unique set of facts,88 it is important to first become 
familiar with the facts of the case. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. (“Occidental”) purchased over 10% of 
Kern County Land Co. (“Old Kern”) common stock and extended a 
tender offer to purchase more.89  But Old Kern opted instead to engage 
in a defensive merger with Tenneco, Inc. (“Tenneco”), under which 
Tenneco agreed to acquire the company through a newly created 
corporation called Kern County Land Co. (“New Kern”).90  Pursuant to 
the merger agreement, Old Kern shareholders were expected to forfeit 
their shares of Old Kern common stock in exchange for the equivalent 
number of Tenneco preferred shares.91 
Occidental, with its takeover attempt thwarted and its stake in Old 
Kern marginalized, took action to protect its interests.92  Pending final 
approval of the Old Kern-Tenneco merger, Occidental reached an 
agreement with Tenneco granting Tenneco’s subsidiary, Tenneco Corp., 
the option to buy all of Occidental’s Old Kern-substituted, Tenneco 
preferred stock at $105 a share.93  Although Tenneco Corp. was only 
authorized to exercise the option more than six months after 
Occidental’s tender offer expired, Occidental and Tenneco executed the 
option agreement within six months of Occidental’s purchase of a more 
                                                                                                                             
 85. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).  Kern County was “the culmination of [a] line of cases, 
the key decision concerning unorthodox transactions, and the only Supreme Court case 
treating the issue in any depth.” Jacobs, supra note 16, at 428. 
 86. See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra Part II. 
 88. See infra Part II. 
 89. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 585. 
 90. Id. at 586. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 587. 
 93. Id. 
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than 10% stake in Old Kern.94  Reasoning that Occidental’s execution of 
the option, as well as its Old Kern-for-Tenneco share exchange, were 
sales that occurred within six months of the purchase that transformed 
Occidental into an over-10% beneficial owner of Old Kern stock, New 
Kern sued for the Section 16(b) disgorgement of Occidental’s realized 
profits.95 
The Supreme Court noted that, while Section 16(b) clearly applied 
to prototypical cash-for-stock purchases and sales, it was less clear 
whether the statute similarly included borderline, “unorthodox 
transactions.”96  Reflecting on prior lower court decisions, the Kern 
County Supreme Court observed that the Section 16(b) fate of a 
borderline transaction depends upon a court’s inquiry into “whether the 
transaction may serve as a vehicle for the evil which Congress sought to 
prevent—the realization of short-swing profits based upon access to 
inside information . . . .”97  The congressional purpose, as articulated in 
Section 16(b)’s introductory clause, controls whether a transaction 
qualifies as a matching purchase or sale under the statute.98 
In offering its unorthodox transaction analysis, the Supreme Court 
adopted the pragmatic approach, which required it to engage in a case-
specific analysis to determine “both from the economics of the 
transaction and the modus operandi of the insider whether there 
exist[ed] the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information.”99  In 
doing so, it rejected the objective approach, previously adopted by some 
lower courts, which subjected all sale and purchase, or purchase and 
sale, combinations to Section 16(b), whether or not they offered any 
potential for speculative abuse.100  Thus the Supreme Court found that 
where Section 16(b)’s introductory purpose clause could not justify 
disgorgement in a specific factual scenario, the typical objective and flat 
                                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at 587–88. 
 95. Id. at 590. 
 96. Id. at 593–94. 
 97. Id. at 594–95. 
 98. Id. at 595. See also Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 424 
n.4 (1972). 
 99. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 612 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  This characterization 
was concocted by the dissent as a pejorative assessment, but rather nicely sums up the 
approach, all the same. 
 100. Id. at 606. 
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application of Section 16(b) would indeed give way to a more subjective 
and malleable rule.101 
Under the unusual circumstances of Kern County, Occidental’s 
tender offer and hostile takeover attempt guaranteed that the target 
company, Old Kern, would not share any inside information with 
Occidental.102  The Court reasoned, therefore, that Occidental’s over-
10% ownership anomalously did not lend itself to the type of 
speculative abuse that could yield guaranteed, short-swing profits.103 
The substitution of Tenneco stock for Occidental’s Old Kern stock 
did not qualify as a purchase or sale subject to 16(b) because of the 
convergence of two factors: the exchange occurred involuntarily and 
under circumstances which precluded any possibility of inside 
information being exploited for speculative gain.104  Moreover, 
execution of the option agreement did not qualify as a Section 16(b) sale 
since it did not present Occidental with a sufficient opportunity to turn a 
speculative profit off of inside information about Old Kern.105  First, 
Occidental and Tenneco’s divergent interests in making the deal made it 
unlikely that Occidental would actually be privy to inside information.106  
Second, the option agreement’s grant of exclusive control to Tenneco to 
decide whether or not to exercise the option after six months precluded 
Occidental from actually engaging in any speculative abuse.107 
                                                                                                                             
 101. The Kern County majority held that the statutory purpose would be best 
honored by a case-by-case analysis. See id. at 594–95 (majority opinion).  The dissent, 
which championed the objective approach, responded by arguing that, in fact “the 
recognized purpose and aim of the statute are more consistently and protectively to be 
served if the statute is construed literally and objectively rather than non-literally and 
subjectively on a case-by-case application.” Id. at 608 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (9th Cir. 1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 102. Id. at 598 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. at 596. 
 104. Id. at 600. 
 105. Id. at 601. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 602–03.  The Court offered a number of other reasons as well to explain 
why the option agreement was not an instrument of speculation. Id. at 603.  Since those 
reasons are not applicable to the present discussion or have since been superseded, they 
will not be addressed in this Note. See infra notes 200–205 and accompanying text 
regarding the current law on the execution and exercise of an option agreement. 
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F. BACKGROUND TO CIRCUIT SPLIT 
While it is clear that the existence of the “the possibility of 
speculative abuse of inside information” is the death knell for the 
Section 16(b) Kern County exemption,108 the exact scope of the 
exemption is unclear and has been a source of confusion among the 
lower courts.  The district court, in Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.,109 
shed some light on the confusion left in the wake of Kern County by at 
least identifying the root of the problem.  It observed that although Kern 
County identified three different factors—accessibility to inside 
information, voluntariness, and the possibility of speculative abuse—to 
consider in a Section 16(b) analysis, it never explained what 
combination of factors would be necessary for an insider to qualify for a 
Section 16(b) Kern County exemption.110 
II. POST-KERN COUNTY CONFUSION: DIVERGENT NOTIONS OF 
FIDELITY TO THE STATUTORY PURPOSE 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Kern County decision, the 
courts’ strict mechanical application of Section 16(b) to qualifying 
orthodox transactions continued unabated.111  As always, the voluntary 
or involuntary nature of the transaction and the insider’s level of access 
to inside information were of no relevance to courts’ Section 16(b) 
purchase and sale calculations;112 however, as with regards to 
unorthodox transactions, a circuit split emerged, with each circuit 
staking out its respective positions on how courts should interpret and 
                                                                                                                             
 108. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 237 (1976). 
 109. 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 110. See Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
 111. See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he 
pragmatic approach has not ousted the objective view.  Rather, the pragmatic approach 
is used to determine the boundaries of the statute’s definitional scope in borderline 
situations, especially unorthodox transactions.  For garden-variety transactions which 
cannot be regarded as unorthodox, the pragmatic approach is not applicable.”). 
 112. This was in full accordance with Kern County’s own statement that “traditional 
cash-for-stock transactions that result in a purchase and sale or a sale and purchase 
within the six-month, statutory period are clearly within the purview of [Section] 16(b) . 
. . .” Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 593. 
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apply the Kern County holding.113  An overwhelming number of courts 
have imposed a double requirement, under which both (a) 
involuntariness and (b) a lack of access to inside information (or an 
absence of potential for speculative abuse) are necessary conditions to 
trigger the Kern County exemption for a particular transaction.114  All 
the same, the circuit courts, based in part on their adoption of either a 
pragmatic or objective approach, differ on the role that each respective 
factor plays in the operation and ultimate scope of the Kern County 
exemption. 
This Part begins by highlighting the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ basic, 
objective approach to interpreting Kern County.  Then, it presents the 
Second Circuit’s application of a subjective, pragmatic approach to Kern 
County.  Finally, it closes with coverage of the SEC’s adoption of the 
Second Circuit approach and its applications therein. 
A. NINTH AND FIFTH CIRCUITS: NARROW KERN COUNTY READING 
OVERLAYING AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH 
Part II.A highlights the Ninth and Fifth Circuits’ objective approach 
to Section 16(b) application.  According to the objective approach, an 
unorthodox transaction that meets the mechanical criteria of Section 
16(b) is automatically subject to Section 16(b)’s trading restrictions and 
may only earn a reprieve from disgorgement if it falls under an 
exceedingly narrow construction of the Kern County exception.115  In 
fact, according to the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, the Kern County 
exception will only apply when the double requirement is met and both 
involuntariness and lack of access to inside information are 
established.116  To test for the double requirement, the Ninth and Fifth 
                                                                                                                             
 113. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 114. Jacobs, supra note 16, at 433.  The factors, access to inside information and 
possibility of speculative abuse, are really one and the same for the purposes of this 
analysis. 
 115. See Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 951 F.2d 1512, 1523 (9th Cir. 1991); Texas 
Int’l Airlines v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533, 539 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 116. Colan, 951 F.2d at 1522 (“Courts following Kern County have recognized that 
involuntariness is an important factor in determining whether or not a transaction 
constitutes a ‘sale’ or ‘purchase’ within section 16(b).”).  The Ninth Circuit decision 
references a Fifth Circuit decision, Texas Int’l Airlines v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 
533, 540 (5th Cir. 1983), and an Eleventh Circuit decision, Gund v. First Florida 
Banks, Inc., 726 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir. 1984), as post-Kern County affirmations that 
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Circuit courts adopt a two-step inquiry, assessing, first, whether the 
offsetting transaction at issue is “unorthodox”, and, second, whether the 
transaction affords a defendant the possibility of engaging in speculative 
abuse of inside information.117  Under this scheme, involuntariness is a 
determining factor in the first step.118  This subsection will proceed by 
first examining one example of the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 
Kern County unorthodox transaction analysis and, second, by offering a 
parallel analysis of one Fifth Circuit court’s application of Kern County. 
1. Ninth Circuit Approach: Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 
In the Ninth Circuit’s Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,119 Mesa had 
purchased a 10% stake in Unocal that it planned to increase by making a 
tender offer.120  But, after Unocal rebuffed Mesa’s takeover bid, Mesa 
reversed course and agreed to exchange its Unocal stock for debt 
securities.121  Significantly, Mesa’s exchange was not involuntary.122  
Mesa negotiated for the resolution and, at most, may have been 
“coerced” by financial exigency.123  Accordingly, the Colan court 
characterized the transactions as voluntary, orthodox transactions, 
subject to Section 16(b).124  The court’s analysis ended after the first step 
of inquiry since the lack of involuntariness rendered the exchange an 
orthodox transaction squarely governed by Section 16(b).125  The court 
did not, therefore, investigate whether defendants had an opportunity to 
engage in the speculative abuse of inside information.126  In its decision, 
the court did not assign any significance to the listing of unorthodox 
transaction types in footnote twenty-four of the Kern County opinion, all 
                                                                                                                             
involuntariness is the second necessary factor of the Section 16(b) unorthodox 
transaction exemption. Id. 
 117. See, e.g., Colan, 951 F.2d at 1523–25; Texas Int’l Airlines, 714 F.2d at 539–40. 
 118. See Colan, 951 F.2d at 1523–25; Texas Int’l Airlines, 714 F.2d at 540. 
 119. 951 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 120. Colan, 951 F.2d at 1514. 
 121. Id. at 1515. 
 122. Id. at 1522. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. (citing Oliff v. Exchange Int’l Corp., 669 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1980); Tyco 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 125. Id. at 1525. 
 126. Id. 
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but dismissing the footnote as unnecessary to the opinion.127  Instead, the 
Ninth Circuit’s two-step analysis, as applied to the case’s unique set of 
facts, alone determined the orthodoxy of a particular transaction128 
The Ninth Circuit analysis throttled any impact Kern County might 
have on other, factually dissimilar cases in the circuit.129  Reading Kern 
County as narrowly as could be, the Ninth Circuit volunteered only that 
Kern County’s Section 16(b) exception could be applied to a factually 
identical case.130  Nothing less than a factual scenario involving a 
merger-induced, involuntary exchange of the target company’s stock for 
another company’s stock could qualify for the Kern County 
exemption.131  The Colan court observed that, not coincidentally, most 
of the unorthodox transactions that qualified for Kern County’s narrow 
exception were stock exchanges effectuated in the context of a 
merger.132 
2. Fifth Circuit Approach: Texas International Airlines v. National 
Airlines, Inc. 
In Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines, Inc.,133 the Fifth 
Circuit, much like the Ninth Circuit, envisioned the voluntariness factor 
as an element in the first step determination of a transaction’s Section 
16(b) orthodoxy, and, more generally, shared the Ninth Circuit’s vision 
of how the two Kern County factors would interact with one another to 
establish a Section 16(b) exception for a particular transaction. 134  In this 
case, Texas International Airlines (“TI”) became a beneficial owner of 
National Airlines, Inc. (“National”) after its holdings crossed the 10% 
threshold.135  Then, within six months of that purchase, TI reached an 
agreement with Pan American World Airways, Inc. (“Pan Am”) to sell 
Pan Am a certain number of National shares at a fixed price.136  Soon 
                                                                                                                             
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1523–25. 
 129. Id. at 1523. 
 130. Id. at 1523. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (citing, e.g., Heublein, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 722 F.2d 29, 31 (2d 
Cir. 1983); Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340, 344 (4th Cir. 1973)). 
 133. Texas Int’l Airlines v. Nat’l Airlines, Inc., 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 134. Id. at 540. 
 135. Id. at 535. 
 136. Id. 
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thereafter, National and Pan Am entered into a merger agreement, which 
incorporated the terms of a stock-for-cash exchange of National stock.137  
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held TI liable since there was nothing 
involuntary about the transaction that could render it unorthodox.138 
Texas International Airlines requires Fifth Circuit courts to honor 
and abide by the mechanical approach to Section 16(b), unless a case 
presents a fact pattern that mimics Kern County, in which case, the 
pragmatic approach would indeed apply.139  So, before ever conducting 
the pragmatic, subjective test to assess the possibility of speculative 
abuse, a court would first need to overcome the initial hurdle of 
branding a Kern County-like transaction as unorthodox.140  According to 
the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s distinction between orthodox 
transactions, such as garden variety cash-for-stock transactions, and 
unorthodox transactions, such as stock-for stock exchanges, does not 
correlate to any greater or lesser chance of speculative abuse.141  Instead, 
the Fifth Circuit opines that, in the view of the Supreme Court, the 
involuntariness factor determines the orthodoxy of a transaction.142 
B. SECOND CIRCUIT: NARROW KERN COUNTY READING OVERLAYING A 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 
Part II.B begins with a presentation of the Second Circuit’s 
subjective, pragmatic approach to Section 16(b)’s operation and a 
demonstration of how it continues to be relevant even post-Kern County.  
Next, Part II.B presents two Second Circuit cases showing that the 
Second Circuit’s unorthodox transaction analysis is predicated on a two-
factor test that screens for both involuntariness and inaccessibility of 
inside information.  Part II.B concludes with the view of a rogue 
Southern District of New York case that, while adopting the pragmatic 
                                                                                                                             
 137. Id.  This was a case where “a defeated tender offeror sold its shares in the 
target corporation to a company with which the target had entered into a merger 
agreement.” Colan, 951 F.2d at 1524. 
 138. Texas Int’l Airlines, 714 F.2d at 540 (“Despite the alleged lack of access to 
inside information and therefore the possibility of speculative abuse, the volitional 
character of the exchange is sufficient reason to trigger applicability of the language of 
section 16(b).”). 
 139. Id. at 539. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 539–40. 
 142. Id. at 540. 
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approach, dismisses the involuntariness factor and implements a single 
factor test for its Kern County analysis. 
The Second Circuit’s subjective, pragmatic approach, which pre-
dates the Supreme Court’s Kern County decision,143 seems to have been 
integrated even post-Kern County.  As per the Second Circuit’s pre-
Kern County design, Section 16(b)’s purpose clause operates as 
something of a gate-keeping provision.144  The potential for speculative 
abuse is a “threshold issue” that must be assessed even before an 
unorthodox transaction’s elements are matched to Section 16(b)’s 
mechanically applied criteria.145  Even now, a Second Circuit court will 
always conduct an initial screening of an unorthodox transaction to 
assess its potential for speculative abuse.146  If an unorthodox transaction 
carries “‘at least the possibility of’ speculative abuse of inside 
information,” a Second Circuit court will immediately apply Section 
16(b) and test for the presence of Section 16(b)’s mechanically applied 
criteria.147  While Second Circuit cases do not explicate the relationship 
between its own threshold test and the Kern County exemption 
analysis,148 it is clear that once the threshold test yields a positive finding 
for a possibility of speculative abuse, the Kern County unorthodox 
transaction exception would no longer serve as a viable defense for the 
insider.149 
1. Second Circuit’s Two-Factor Kern County Analysis 
In conducting an unorthodox transaction analysis, the Second 
Circuit, almost uniformly, has adopted a narrow reading of Kern County 
                                                                                                                             
 143. See Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 519–20 (2d Cir. 1966) (reversing Second 
Circuit’s earlier application of an objective rule). 
 144. See Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (“[T]o judge whether section 16(b) means what it says, a court must first ask 
whether the statute, in light of its purpose, should mean what it says.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 145. See, e.g., Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351, 353 (2d Cir. 1970). 
 146. Portnoy, 516 F. Supp. at 1195. 
 147. See, e.g., Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 46 (2d Cir. 2012); Blau, 
363 F.2d at 519. 
 148. See, e.g., Huppe, 670 F.3d at 218–19; Steel Partners II, L.P. v. Bell Indus., Inc., 
315 F.3d 120, 129 (2d Cir. 2002); Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 
305, 310 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 149. See cases cited supra note 147. 
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that mandates the presence of both Kern County factors to warrant a 
possible exemption from 16(b) disgorgement.  In particular, the Second 
Circuit has insisted on fulfillment of Kern County’s “two factors: (1) the 
unlikelihood of actual access to inside information in an atmosphere of 
hostility by a party adverse in interest; and (2) the utter inability of the 
unsuccessful party to control the course of events.”150  In fact, in 
American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co.,151 a Second Circuit decision 
rendered just a few years after Kern County, the court immediately 
subscribed to the dual requirement view.152 
In American Standard, Crane Co. (“Crane”) acquired a more than 
10% stake in Westinghouse Air Brake Co. (“Air Brake”) stock, with the 
intention of ultimately effecting a merger between the two companies.153  
Air Brake, however, rejected Crane’s overtures and negotiated a 
defensive merger with American Standard Inc. (“Standard”).154  Under 
the deal, Air Brake shareholders, such as Crane, would receive a certain 
amount of Standard shares in exchange for their outstanding Brake 
shares.155  As the merger agreement dictated, Crane exchanged its Brake 
shares for Standard shares; a few days later, Crane sold off its newly 
acquired Standard shares for a substantial profit.156  Standard filed suit, 
alleging that Crane  violated Section 16(b) by purchasing and selling the 
issuer’s stocks within a six month period, thereby exploiting the inside 
information it was privy to in order to earn short swing profits.157  The 
Second Circuit, however, rejected Standard’s claims, in part, by 
comparing Crane, the defeated tender offeror in American Standard, to 
Occidental, the defeated tender offeror in Kern County.158  Even though 
Crane was a 10% stockholder, typically presumed to be an insider, no 
such presumption could be afforded in this defensive merger context 
                                                                                                                             
 150. American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 510 F.2d 1043, 1054 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 151. 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 152. Id. at 1053. Ironically, American Standard described the defensive merger 
context in Kern County to be “sui generis,” intimating, much like the Ninth and Fifth 
Circuits later held, that the Kern County exception might be exceedingly limited. Id. 
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions did not take such a restrictive approach, however. 
 153. Id. at 1047. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1048. 
 156. Id. at 1049. 
 157. Id. at 1051.  The Court presented three alternative theories as to which two 
transactions qualified for the matching purchase and sale. See id. 
 158. Id. at 1053–55. 
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where the underlying hostilities between Standard and Crane all but 
guaranteed there would be no exchange of confidential information.159  
Moreover, Crane’s failure to prevent the unwanted merger from taking 
place was itself proof that Crane did not exert much control over the 
target company’s directors or stockholders.160  
Subsequent Second Circuit decisions have adhered to American 
Standard’s dual requirement view, confirming that the Kern County 
exemption only applies to (1) an involuntary transaction (2) conducted 
by a beneficial owner who lacks access to inside information.161  
Moreover, since American Standard, the Second Circuit has continued 
to subscribe to its particular view of how the two Kern County factors 
interact.  The Second Circuit’s decision in At Home Corp. v. Cox 
Communications, Inc.162 brings the Second Circuit’s application of the 
Kern County dual requirement into clear view.  In At Home, Comcast, a 
10% beneficial owner of At Home Corp., reached an agreement with 
AT&T to buy puts, or the right to sell shares, in At Home Corp.163  
Around the same time, Comcast purchased three cable companies, 
which already owned warrants in At Home Corp.164  Finally, Comcast 
proceeded to exercise the puts it had purchased from AT&T.165 
In assessing potential 16(b) liability in At Home, the district court 
framed the issue as a matter of whether a matching purchase occurs 
when an insider (Comcast) acquires a third-party company that holds 
stock in the corporate issuer (At Home Corp.) and, in effect, indirectly 
purchases the issuer’s stock.166  The district court applied the Kern 
County unorthodox transaction analysis and found that the transaction 
did not qualify as a Section 16(b) purchase since it did not elicit any 
concerns of speculative abuse.167  The Second Circuit, however, 
                                                                                                                             
 159. Id. at 1062 (“The enemy of yesterday is not the friendly insider of tomorrow.”). 
 160. Id. at 1055. 
 161. Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218–19 (2d Cir. 2012); Analytical 
Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 45 (2d Cir. 2012); At Home Corp. v. 
Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 446 F.3d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 162. 446 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 163. At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 404, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 410. 
 167. Id. at 411. 
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resoundingly rejected the district court’s analysis, since the two 
prerequisites for Kern County analysis were not met.168 
According to the Second Circuit, Kern County’s unorthodox 
transaction analysis does not apply to an insider transaction simply 
because it may take effect via a newly conceived financial instrument.169  
Rather, the Kern County analysis will only yield an effective defense for 
the insider if both the insider and the transaction are found to be 
“atypical.”170  In Kern County, the insider was atypical since it passed 
the two-factor test; it did not have access to insider knowledge and it 
sold its shares involuntarily.171  In At Home, however, where the two 
Kern County criteria were not both met, the insider was typical; no 
matter how novel or atypical the transaction may have been, the court 
could not apply the unorthodox transaction analysis.172 
If the Kern County exception analysis fails, as it often does in the 
Second Circuit, the Second Circuit still offers a simple, direct route 
towards Section 16(b) exemption that bypasses the more treacherous 
route paved by Kern County.173  As per its methodology of interpreting 
Section 16(b) in line with the statutory purpose,174  the Second Circuit 
will construe Section 16(b) narrowly when necessary to prevent its harsh 
application.175  In fact, in At Home, where it was unlikely that a 
company takeover would have been initiated just to reap short-term, 
speculative profits, the Second Circuit ultimately exempted the 
transaction from Section 16(b) liability by offering a statutory 
justification. 176  The court inferred from the singular form of the 
                                                                                                                             
 168. At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, 446 F.3d 403, 408 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id.  This characterization is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the more 
logical and straightforward formulation that would treat the insider as atypical given its 
lack of access and the transaction as atypical in light of its involuntary nature. 
 172. Id.  In two recent cases, the Second Circuit similarly refused to apply the 
unorthodox transaction exception where both Kern County criteria were not met. See 
Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2012); Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. 
Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 173. See, e.g., At Home Corp., 446 F.3d at 408–10. 
 174. Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) 
(quoting Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 1969)). 
 175. See, e.g., At Home Corp., 446 F.3d at 408–10. 
 176. Id. at 409.  Given the disproportionate resources necessary to effect an 
acquisition of a company and the entirely separate set of risks and opportunities 
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statutory terms, “equity security” and “such issuer,” that 16(b) liability 
could only attach where each transaction in a matching pair involved the 
equity securities of the same company.177 
2. Minority Southern District Court View Rejecting the Involuntariness 
Factor 
Part II.B.2 presents a minority court view that rejects Kern 
County’s involuntariness factor as a necessary criterion for Section 
16(b) disgorgement.  While this view is largely discredited in the 
Second Circuit, it highlights the ambiguity in Kern County’s 
presentation of the governing factors for its unorthodox transaction 
analysis.  This subsection proceeds by analyzing the representative case 
on point. 
A minority view among the lower courts recognizes the dual 
elements invoked in Kern County, but refuses to characterize them both 
as necessary criteria for Section 16(b) disgorgement.178  In one Southern 
District of New York case, Portnoy v. Seligman & Latz, Inc.,179 for 
example, the court adopted a single factor standard, whereby the 
plaintiff would only need to “show more than . . . a speculative potential 
for speculative abuse of inside information.”180  In doing so, the court 
brushed aside involuntariness and all but branded it an irrelevant factor 
in establishing a Kern County exemption.181  In fact, it refused to 
recognize Occidental’s sale of Tenneco shares in Kern County as having 
been truly involuntary in the first place since Occidental, to the very 
end, “was given a choice, not an ultimatum, to withdraw its investment, 
plus a handsome profit, after losing the merger battle.”182 
                                                                                                                             
presented therein, the Second Circuit compared the likelihood of an insider purchasing 
a company to reap speculative profits to an investor “speculating in tractors by buying a 
farm.” Id. at 409.  Nevertheless, the court conceded that a case-specific analysis was 
necessary to reach its decision in this case since it was still possible that, under different 
conditions, where the target company was a shell company that only held the issuer’s 
securities, an insider could have incentive to purchase the company solely to purchase 
its security holdings. Id. at 409–10. 
 177. Id. at 408–09. 
 178. See, e.g., Portnoy, 516 F. Supp. at 1198; Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 
1129, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 179. 516 F. Supp. 1188. 
 180. Id. at 1200. 
 181. Id. at 1198. 
 182. Id. 
2013] SECTION 16(b) EXISTENTIALISM 717 
 
In Portnoy, defendant corporate insiders at Seligman & Latz sold 
their personally-owned warrants in the company stock to a number of 
underwriters.183  The underwriters subsequently exercised the warrants 
so that they could include the underlying stock in the public offering of 
Seligman & Latz stock.184  The insiders, meanwhile, earned a tidy profit 
from their sale of the warrants to the underwriters.185  Plaintiffs, filing 
suit under Section 16(b), demanded disgorgement of those profits on the 
theory that the underwriters essentially acted as the insiders’ agents, 
remotely allowing the insiders to purchase company stock through the 
underwriters’ exercise of the stock and, within six months, to sell the 
stocks at a profit through the public offering.186 
Portnoy, however, dismissed any claims of an agency 
relationship.187  Moreover, it held that the exercise of the warrants did 
not constitute a statutory Section 16(b) purchase that could be paired 
with the defendants’ initial sale of the warrants.188  Since the contract 
between the insiders and the underwriters fixed the warrants’ exercise 
price from the outset, the warrants’ exercise was nearly immune from 
speculative abuse.189  Even though the insiders’ sale of the warrants was 
wholly voluntary, it did not matter; the lack of potential for speculative 
abuse alone dictated that Section 16(b) would not apply.190 
C.  SEC POSTSCRIPT: ADOPTION OF SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRAGMATIC 
APPROACH & RESULTING INCLUSION OF DERIVATIVE SECURITIES AS 16(b) 
PURCHASES & SALES 
Since Section 16(b)’s inception, it was always clear that an 
insider’s matching purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the 
corporate issuer’s equity securities was subject to Section 16(b) 
regulation, but courts were split on whether Section 16(b) also applied to 
more complex financial instruments involving derivative securities.  The 
Second Circuit, for one, generally maintained that transactions in 
                                                                                                                             
 183. Id. at 1189. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 1189–90. 
 187. Id. at 1196. 
 188. Id. at 1195–96. 
 189. Id. at 1195. 
 190. Id. at 1198. 
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derivative securities could qualify as Section 16(b) purchases and 
sales.191  The Second Circuit, therefore, applied Section 16(b) to 
transactions in derivative securities no differently than to equity 
securities, as long as there was at least the possibility of speculative 
abuse of inside information.192  Other courts, however, were less willing 
to expand the Section 16(b) zone of bona fide purchases and sales to 
include transactions in derivative securities.193  This uneven application 
of Section 16(b) to derivative securities, whose use had become 
increasingly popular, posed a challenge to the effective administration of 
Section 16(b).194   
The purpose of Section 16(b) remained front and center and, in 
fact, seems to have been the driving force behind the SEC’s amendment 
to include the purchase and sale of derivative securities as Section 16(b) 
matching transactions.195  Specifically, in its 1991 amendments, the SEC 
sought to stop investors from transacting in derivatives, rather than in 
the underlying equity securities, as a means of circumventing liability 
under Section 16(b).196  The SEC could effectively step in to close the 
loophole since it was afforded special statutory authority under Section 
16(b), which explicitly carved out an exception for “any transaction . . . 
which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not 
                                                                                                                             
 191. See Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 
2012) (quoting Huppe v. WPCS Int’l Inc., 670 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2012)); Blau v. 
Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 516 (2d Cir. 1966).  The Second Circuit’s position was 
crystallized by its 1966 decision in Blau, 363 F.2d 507, and stands in contrast with 
some of its earlier decisions. See, e.g., Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 
1962); Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1954). 
 192. See Huppe, 670 F.3d at 218–19; Analytical Surveys, Inc., 684 F.3d at 43, 46; 
Blau, 363 F.2d at 516. 
 193. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal 
Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, 
7249 n.107 (Feb. 21, 1991) (citing Colan v. Monumental Corp., 713 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 
1983); Morales v. Mapco, 541 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1976); Silverman, 306 F.2d 422; 
Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426). 
 194. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal 
Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, 56 Fed. Reg. at 7248. 
 195. Id. (“Given the uncertainty surrounding the application of Section 16 to 
derivative securities under the former rules and existing case law, the Commission is 
adopting a comprehensive regulatory framework, in order to effect the purposes of 
section 16 and to address the proliferation of derivative securities and the popularity of 
exchange-traded options.”). 
 196. Magma Power Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 136 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.”197  Since rules 
promulgated by the SEC are entitled to deference,198 courts have 
generally treated them as good law.199 
As per the 1991 amendments issued by the SEC, Section 16(b) now 
applies to the sale and purchase of derivative securities,200 including 
“any option, warrant, convertible security, stock appreciation right, or 
similar right with an exercise or conversion privilege related to an equity 
security . . . .”201  In the words of Rule 16b-6(a), “[t]he establishment of 
or increase in a call equivalent position . . . or put equivalent position” is 
equivalent to a Section 16(b) purchase or sale of the underlying 
security.202  Given that framework, a derivative security transaction 
could be paired with either an offsetting derivative security transaction 
                                                                                                                             
 197. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
Technically speaking, the SEC exceeded the bounds of its statutory right to exempt 
transactions by drafting regulations meant to include the class of derivative securities 
under Section 16(b).  While the Third Circuit stated that “[t]he Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 authorizes the SEC to enact regulations defining which transactions are 
included in the ban on short-swing trading,” Morrison v. Madison Dearborn Capital 
Partners III L.P., 463 F.3d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 2006), a narrow reading of the statute 
would suggest otherwise. 
 198. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843–44 (1984). 
 199. See, e.g., At Home Corp. v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 446 F.3d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 
2006); Roth v. Perseus, L.L.C., 522 F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 200. Derivative securities are “financial instruments that derive their value (hence 
the name) from an underlying security or index.” Magma Power, 136 F.3d at 321.  
Equity securities, on the other hand, are actual stocks, or similar securities. Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(11) (2006). 
 201. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(c) (2012).  Transactions conducted in some of these 
financial instruments were previously termed “unorthodox transactions” by Professor 
Louis Loss, and the Supreme Court seems to have vouched for Loss’s understanding in 
its infamously ambiguous Kern County footnote. See infra note 214 and accompanying 
text. 
 202. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6(a) (2012).   
An option . . . is a purchased right to buy or sell property at a fixed or floating price . . 
. .  A call option gives the option holder the right to buy shares of an underlying 
security at a particular price; thus, a call equivalent position is a derivative security 
position that increases in value as the value of the underlying equity increases . . . .  A 
put option is the right to sell a security at a specified price; thus, the value of a put 
option increases as the price of the underlying security falls.  A put equivalent 
position . . . increases in value as the value of the underlying equity security 
decreases.  
Magma Power, 136 F.3d at 321 n.2 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
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or a transaction in the underlying security in order to trigger 
disgorgement.203  The amendments drastically changed the Section 16(b) 
prospects of “unorthodox transactions” in derivative securities, which 
were not uniformly treated as 16(b) purchases or sales up until that 
point.204  The SEC’s inclusion of derivative security instruments under 
Section 16(b) exposed all transactions in derivative securities to 16(b) 
disgorgement.205  At the same time, the typical rules for excepting 
unorthodox transactions became applicable to the many derivative 
security instruments that were so classified. 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PRAGMATIC KERN COUNTY 
ANALYSIS 
The most natural approach to Section 16(b), from a statutory 
perspective, requires implementation of the Ninth and Fifth Circuit 
objective approach.  After all, Section 16(b)’s mechanical criteria set the 
tone for the objective, strict liability-like approach by compelling 
disgorgement of short-swing profits regardless of the insider’s intent and 
irrespective of whether the insider actually misused inside information 
for personal gain.206  The introductory purpose clause can be dismissed 
as a mere statement of constitutional justification that should not dictate 
the operation of 16(b).207  Therefore, the pragmatic approach, which 
infuses 16(b)’s introductory purpose clause with greater operational 
leeway than it grants its crude rule of thumb, must incorporate some 
semblance of the objective approach into its scheme.  The Second 
Circuit’s uneasy marriage of the objective and subjective approaches 
highlights the inherent weakness in its position and necessarily limits its 
application. 
Part III identifies and analyzes some curiosities and inconsistencies 
in the Second Circuit approach that may best reflect or even seek to 
                                                                                                                             
 203. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal 
Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 28,869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, 
7251 (Feb. 21, 1991). 
 204. Id. at 7249 (“Unlike the results under prior Commission rules and case law, 
under the rules adopted today, transactions in the derivative securities are matchable 
against transactions in the underlying securities and against each other.”). 
 205. Id. (“[S]hort-swing profits obtained through use of derivative securities are 
recoverable.”). 
 206. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). 
 207. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
2013] SECTION 16(b) EXISTENTIALISM 721 
 
compensate for the tension inherent in adopting a pragmatic test in the 
face of the statute’s objective overtones.  This Part begins by unpacking 
the seemingly overlapping Second Circuit and Supreme Court standards 
that the Second Circuit consistently invokes.  Then, it proceeds to offer 
an explanation for the redundancy in light of the objective-subjective 
conundrum.  In doing so, it highlights how the Second Circuit’s 
pragmatic approach unsuccessfully incorporates some measure of 
objectivity into its Kern County test so as to comply with Section 
16(b)’s clear statutory mandate for an objective test.  Second, this Part 
critically examines the Second Circuit’s reading of Kern County’s 
unorthodox transaction exemption as a two-factor test and suggests that 
the formal, element-based criteria offer a concession of sorts to the 
objective approach.  It concludes that the Second Circuit fails to protect 
the prophylactic quality of Section 16(b), as only a fully objective 
approach can effectively do. 
1. OVERLAPPING KERN COUNTY AND SECOND CIRCUIT TESTS 
The Second Circuit approach is largely rooted in Blau v. Lamb,208 a 
pre-Kern County decision in which the Second Circuit subjected a 
transaction involving the conversion of securities to Section 16(b) 
liability.  There, the court unequivocally stated that stock conversions, 
like all other acquisitions and dispositions of equity securities, would 
qualify as purchases and sales under the broad definitions of the terms in 
the Exchange Act.209  However, the court hedged, qualifying that a 
particular transaction’s classification as a Section 16(b) sale or purchase 
would hinge on application of a pragmatic test assessing whether the 
transaction afforded the insider any opportunity to unfairly trade on 
inside information.210  Technically, the court was saying that it would 
not necessarily compel disgorgement from a transaction that met all the 
mechanical criteria of 16(b).211  This statutory scheme was devised and 
applied specifically to blunt the harshness of Section 16(b)’s otherwise 
objective, strict liability-like mandate.212 
                                                                                                                             
 208. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (1966). 
 209. Id. at 516. 
 210. Id. at 518. 
 211. Id. at 519. 
 212. Id. 
722 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
The Supreme Court’s Kern County ruling accredited the lower 
courts’ category of borderline, or unorthodox transactions to be used in 
reference to transactions that could not justifiably merit consideration as 
a purchase or sale even under the broad, liberal meanings of the terms.213  
In footnote twenty-four, the Supreme Court identified unorthodox 
transactions as including derivative securities such as “stock 
conversions, exchanges pursuant to mergers and other corporate 
reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and dealings in options, rights 
and warrants.”214  In ruling on their Section 16(b) eligibility, the 
Supreme Court invoked the very standard adopted by Blau.215  In other 
words, it held that unorthodox transactions qualify as bona-fide Section 
16(b) purchases and sales if they give rise to the possibility of 
speculative abuse.216  The Supreme Court then proceeded in ad hoc 
fashion to determine whether the transaction at issue did, in fact, give 
rise to speculative abuse, as required under Blau’s pragmatic test.217  In 
so doing, it paid particular attention to the factors of involuntariness and 
lack of access to inside information.218  All the same, this litmus test did 
not express itself as a formal rule.219  The ad hoc confluence of the 
factors ultimately gave rise to the confusion that enveloped the lower 
circuit courts.220 
But, even after the Supreme Court’s Kern County ruling, Second 
Circuit decisions continued to muddle the waters by citing Blau’s 
threshold test in the context of the Kern County test.221  Neither the 
Supreme Court, nor any subsequent Second Circuit decisions map out 
exactly how the two work in tandem.222  It is unclear, for example, 
whether the Blau test is meant as a first-step inquiry, to be followed by 
the Kern County test if no possibility of speculative abuse is found 
                                                                                                                             
 213. Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593–94 
(1973). 
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 215. Kern Cnty., 411 U.S. at 595. 
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Gwozdzinsky v. Zell/Chilmark Fund, L.P., 156 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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initially, or whether the two ultimately overlap.  However, the simplest 
understanding would seem to be that the Kern County two-factor test 
provides the substance to Blau’s “possibility of speculative abuse” form.  
Kern County’s contribution, according to the Second Circuit, would be 
that it designed a two-factor test for involuntariness and inaccessibility 
to inside information that would be determinative of whether a given 
transaction lent itself to the possibility of speculative abuse. 
The Second Circuit may have continued to cite to Blau, even after 
Kern County, in order to display some modicum of fidelity to the 
explicitly objective properties of Section 16(b).  After all, Blau’s 
speculative abuse test is formulated not as an independent assessment of 
a transaction’s faculty for speculation, but as an initial inquiry to 
determine whether or not a transaction is formally a “purchase” or a 
“sale.”223  If Kern County’s two-factor test is, in fact, an explication of 
the Second Circuit’s speculative abuse test, this would mean that an 
insider’s voluntariness in conducting a transaction and potential to 
access inside information would determine a transaction’s merits for 
“purchase” or “sale” classification.  By treating these factors as criteria 
in the statutory definition of a “purchase” and “sale,” the Second 
Circuit, at least, gives off an impression of fidelity to Section 16(b)’s 
formalistic and objective statutory elements.  As such, it injects an 
element of certainty and predictability into an ad hoc analysis that 
already strains the prophylactic quality of Section 16(b).224  Other 
Second Circuit courts have similarly characterized the possibility of 
speculative abuse test as a predicate to identifying a transaction as a 
“purchase” or “sale,” presumably as a concession to 16(b)’s standard of 
objectivity.225 
However, the Second Circuit’s valiant effort to infuse its Blau 
pragmatic approach with a dose of statutory objectivity does not pass 
muster.  The Second Circuit’s bundling of involuntariness and 
inaccessibility as necessary elements in the classification of a statutory 
16(b) purchase or sale seems counterintuitive.  It stands to reason 
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instead that involuntariness should dictate whether the insider actually 
conducted a sale or purchase, while inaccessibility to inside information 
should determine whether there was a possibility of speculative abuse.  
In fact, this is exactly how the Ninth and Fifth Circuits understood the 
dynamic between the two factors in Kern County’s unorthodox 
transaction analysis.226  Moreover, Kern County’s explicit, side-by-side 
pairing of involuntariness and lack of the possibility of speculative 
abuse as prerequisites for initiating the unorthodox transaction 
analysis227 proves the Second Circuit’s treatment of involuntariness as a 
factor in establishing the absence of a possibility of speculative abuse228 
cannot be accurate. 
2. SECOND CIRCUIT READING OF KERN COUNTY AS A FORMAL, TWO-
FACTOR TEST 
The Second Circuit’s insistence on both involuntariness and 
inaccessibility to inside information as elements of a formal test for the 
possibility of speculative abuse can be similarly understood as an ode to 
the objectivity of Section 16(b)’s statutory language.  It is true that a 
close reading of Kern County may support the Second Circuit’s dual 
requirement approach and that most lower courts have subscribed to that 
view.229  Nevertheless, the need for both criteria is suspect, as scholar 
Arnold S. Jacobs observes.230  Jacobs argues it is superfluous to require 
fulfillment of both factors if the purpose is simply to prevent insider 
trading; one or the other would suffice for that purpose.231 
Strictly speaking, Jacobs may be right; but the double requirement 
can be justified if seen as essentially a hybrid, subjective-objective test.  
In fact, this may be ideal under the Second Circuit’s subjective 
approach, which tailors the application of Section 16(b) to transactions 
that violate the statutory purpose.  By giving some definite form to its 
Kern County analysis, the Second Circuit curtails some of the 
unpredictability that its pragmatic approach engenders, and restores 
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some level of deterrence to the application of Section 16(b), which was, 
a priori, devised for its prophylactic quality.  Moreover, practically 
speaking, the imposition of Kern County’s two-factor test on Blau’s 
pragmatic test severely shrinks the number of cases that would come out 
differently under the objective and subjective approaches.  Under this 
scheme, an objective approach effectively applies anyway, unless an 
insider, who has access to inside information, conducts a voluntary 
transaction. 
CONCLUSION 
The drafters of Section 16(b) likely never intended for the 
introductory purpose clause to play a decisive role in Section 16(b)’s 
application.232  On the contrary, they envisioned an objective, 
mechanical operation of Section 16(b) that could trigger disgorgement 
of an insider’s ill-gained profits as long as the statutory elements of 
Section 16(b) were present.233  Under that strict liability-like approach, 
the law imposed liability even if the defendant insider never intended to 
earn a speculative profit from his or her inside knowledge and even if 
the defendant insider never actually possessed inside information that he 
or she could exploit for personal gain.234 
The flat rule further stipulated that insiders who managed to evade 
Section 16(b)’s reach by spacing offsetting transactions six months and 
one day apart were perfectly within their rights to do so.235  As the Court 
in Kern County famously declared, Congress “sought to curb the evils of 
insider trading [by] taking the profits out of a class of transactions in 
which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great.”236  
The prophylactic rule was only realistically expected to prevent 
instances where the possibility of abuse was intolerably great, but had 
no illusion of completely eliminating the evil of insider trading.  As a 
prophylactic rule, Section 16(b) was carefully crafted to simplify 
implementation of the rule and keep the costs of administration down.237  
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In fact, it may well be that Section 16(b) was never criminalized for the 
same reason; the drafters never planned to expend considerable 
resources in prosecuting violators of the law since the expectation was 
that Section 16(b) would act primarily as an agent of deterrence.238 
In light of Section 16(b)’s clearly objective criteria, it is 
understandable why it would seem appropriate to marginalize the 
introductory purpose clause’s role in Section 16(b)’s application.  
Professor Thel, for one, concluded: “The clause may deserve respect, 
but when it was inserted, no one suggested that it would control the 
operative reach of the statute, and by and large it has not.”239  But, while 
Professor Thel may have been right to observe that the statutory purpose 
was never meant to control the statutory reach, it is no longer accurate to 
say that it does not do just that.  In fact, Section 16(b)’s introductory 
purpose clause has assumed a determinative role in the adjudication of 
Section 16(b) suits that was likely never imagined by its drafters. 
This is particularly so in the Second Circuit, which has 
wholeheartedly embraced the pragmatic approach to Section 16(b) and 
elevated the purpose clause to the role of arbiter of the orthodoxy and 
Section 16(b) liability for all transactions undertaken by an insider.240  
To be sure, the statutory purpose is limited by a narrow reading of Kern 
County that confines the unorthodox transaction exception to 
circumstances in which both Kern County factors are present.241  Yet, as 
the history of Section 16(b) has shown, the introductory purpose clause 
has come to overshadow the flat rule and frustrate some of its goals.242  
In fact, most courts have adopted the pragmatic approach, limiting 
Section 16(b) disgorgement to those instances where the possibility of 
speculative abuse exists.243  The SEC has similarly operated under the 
presumption that the statutory goal is controlling.244  When the 
proliferation of derivative securities exposed a gap in the law that 
insiders could exploit by transacting in derivatives, the SEC exercised 
its power to protect the goals of Section 16(b) and close the gap. 
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While these adaptations may have been necessary to sustain 
Section 16(b)’s viability in an age of increasingly complex financial 
instruments, we should acknowledge at what cost this survival has 
come.  In courts today, Section 16(b) analyses increasingly crop up in 
the context of unorthodox transactions,245 a sign that simple 
administration of the law has become elusive and that the prophylactic 
quality of Section 16(b) is flailing.246  The courts’ pragmatic approaches 
require case-specific analyses that belie Section 16(b)’s simple 
administration.  It is that erosion of Section 16(b)’s clear, mechanical 
operation that has diluted Section 16(b)’s value as a deterrent.  Even the 
purpose clause, which seemingly emerges as the victor, has lost some of 
its prophylactic luster. 
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